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I. IntroduCtIon
A result of  the creation of  the Internet is that the real world no longer 
is the only space in which interpersonal interaction occurs.1 Now, a completely 
new, somehow parallel-to-reality plane exists that escapes geographical limitations. 
It forces redefinition of  the concepts of  sovereignty and jurisdiction.2 Individual 
countries, to some extent grouped, have begun to seek any foothold that allows 
them to regulate and punish behaviours undertaken by Internet users.
This study is a critical analysis of  solutions used to determine the scope 
of  criminal jurisdiction in cyberspace. Considering the intensive development of  
social interactions undertaken using the Internet, it appears justified to move away 
from a rigid model of  jurisdictional rules and shift to a discursive model based on 
weighing the interests of  states.
The considerations are divided into six parts. Section II presents a short 
description of  a method based on classical jurisdictional rules. Section III includes 
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1 See inter alia: Stine Gotved, “Time and space in cyber social reality” (2006) 8 New Media & Soci-
ety 467–86; Toni C Antonucci, Kristine J Ajrouch and Jasmine A Manalel, “Social Relations and 
Technology: Continuity, Context, and Change” (2017) 3 Innov Aging 1–9.
2 Michael N Schmitt, Liis Vihul (eds), Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber 
Operations (CUP 2017) 12; Dan L Burk, “Muddy Rules for Cyberspace” (1999) 21 Cardozo L Rev 
121, 122; Michael N Schmitt, Liis Vihul, “Respect for Sovereignty in Space” (2017) 95 Tex L Rev 
1639; Joanna Kulesza, International Internet Law (Roudlegde 2012) 2–3.
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a discussion of  traditional approach defects, particularly considering those features 
that prevent the application of  that traditional approach to behaviours undertaken 
using cyberspace. Section IV discusses an alternative method of  determining scope 
of  jurisdiction based on important elements of  the social situation (jurisdictional 
links). Sections V and VI parts are devoted to an analysis of  individual nexuses. In 
Section VII, the method of  weighing the significance of  the links is presented. This 
method allows granting a particular state the right to regulate or impose a penalty 
for a given behaviour on the Internet.
II. prInCIples of jurIsdICtIon as a tradItIonal metHod of  
estaBlIsHIng jurIsdICtIon In CrImInal Cases
The jurisdiction principles are currently the substantive basis for making 
claims for regulation or penalisation.3 To demonstrate the existence of  the power to 
legislate and enforce the law, the state relies on one of  the four main jurisdictional 
principles: territoriality,4 the active personality principle,5 the passive personality 
principle6 and the protective principle.7 This catalogue is broadened in the case of  
competences that constitute ius puniendi,8 in which the authorisations are also based 
on the principle of  vicarious jurisdiction9 and the rule of  universal jurisdiction.10 
The above are confirmed by argumentation conducted in the context of  disputes 
3 Adria Allen, “Internet Jurisdiction Today” (2001) 22 Nw J Int’l L & Bus 69, 75; Ray August, “In-
ternational Cyber-Jurisdiction: A Comparative Analysis”, (2002) 39 ABLJ 531, 534; Christopher 
Kuner, “Data Protection Law and International Jurisdiction on the Internet (Part I)” (2010) 18 
International Journal of  Law and Information Technology 176, 188–191; Kulesza (n 2) 6.
4 Cherif  M Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity: Historical Evolution and Contemporary Application (CUP 
2011) 279; “Extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction. Council of  Europe” European Committee on Crime 
Problems (1992) 3 Criminal Law Forum 441, 446.
5 Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law (2nd Ed, OUP 2015) 89; Bassiouni (n 4) 279; 
Danielle Ireland-Piper, “Prosecutions of  Extraterritorial Criminal Conduct and the Abuse of  
Rights Doctrine” (2013) 9 Utrecht L Rev 68, 74; William R Slomanson, Fundamental Perspectives on 
International Law (Wadsworth Publishing 2010) 250. 
6 Ryngaert (n 5) 93; Bassiouni (n 4) 279; Geoffrey R Watson, “The Passive Personality Principle” 
(1993) 28 Tex Int’l LJ 1 18; Jonathan O Hafen, “International Extradition: Issues Arising under 
the Dual Criminality Requirement” (1992) BYU L Rev 19, 218; John G McCarthy, “The Passive 
Personality Principle and Its Use in Combatting International Terrorism” (1989) 13 Fordham Int’l 
LJ 298, 301. 
7 Ryngaert (n 5) 97; Bassiouni (n 4) 279; Extraterritorial (n 4) 451.
8 Kai Ambos, “Punishment without a Sovereign? The Ius Puniendi Issue of  International Criminal 
Law: A First Contribution towards a Consistent Theory of  International Criminal Law” (2013) 33 
OJLS 293, 297–8; Andrzej Sakowicz, Zasada ne bis in idem w prawie karnym (Temida2 2011) 138.
9 Ryngaert (n 5) 103; Extraterritorial (n 4) 452.
10 Ryngaert (n 5) 106; The Princeton Project on Universal Jurisdiction (Program in Law and Public Affairs Princ-
eton University 2001) 28; Hafen (n 6) 219; Bassiouni (n 4) 280.
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over competences between countries, in which individual parties derive their rights 
from the facts of  the application of  these principles.11 Recourse to a given principle 
is made to justify the right to exercise state authority.
All jurisdiction principles mentioned above have evolved in the course of  
the historical development of  international law.12 They are, in fact, of  a customary 
nature. They refer to the bonds existing between a specific social situation and 
the state. Over the centuries, however, there has been a specific looping in this 
area. Its effects are particularly strongly felt in today’s realities. Historical analysis 
permits advancing the thesis that the rules of  jurisdiction have developed as a 
legal description of  socially significant connections and have slowly “ossified”. As 
social relationships evolved and new connections developed that were of  great 
importance, no new jurisdictional rules were created; instead, there was an attempt 
to enter such relationships and connections into already existing content. This 
approach also has been applied to social situations that occur in cyberspace.
Particularly noteworthy in this context are two circumstances, the 
recognition of  which is essential for describing the weaknesses of  the classical 
jurisdictional model.
First, the jurisdiction rules were included in the national legal systems 
at a time when virtually all human activities were of  a physical nature. Social 
situations that were regulated by law were clearly defined in space.13 The resulting 
consequences were characterised by a small spatial scope, which in principle was 
easy to predict from an ex-ante perspective. This point is evidenced by academic 
examples used to discuss cross-border crimes, in terms of  elements such as causing 
11 Ellen S Podgor, “Cybercrime: Discretionalnary Jurisdiction” (2008–2009) 47 U Louisville L Rev 
727, 729.
12 Howard J Grootes, “Territorial Jurisdiction in Cyberspace” (2002) 4 Or Rev Int’l L 17, 28; Tallin 
(n 2) 51.
13 Georgios I Zekos, “State Cyberspace Jurisdiction and Personal Cyberspace Jurisdiction” (2007) 15 
International Journal of  Law and Information Technology, 1, 20. 
Criminal Jurisdiction over the Internet4
a result by an archery shot.14 Cross-border was a marginal problem; therefore, it 
did not require the development of  sophisticated, dogmatic instruments. 
Second, the system of  analysed principles was developed many years before 
the modern concept of  human rights was verbalised.15 Consequently, the former 
does not consider the rights of  the individual, which directly affects how the limits 
of  the state’s jurisdiction are determined.16 The jurisdictional principles focus on 
inter-state relations. The reference point here is the need for protection of  the 
sovereignty of  independent entities of  international law, which has important 
consequences; an inter-state dispute can always be resolved ex post at the political 
level.17 Such a situation is unacceptable when considering an individual’s right to 
become familiar with the content of  the law in force.
III. defeCtIVeness of tHe tradItIonal metHod Based on jurIsdICtIonal 
prInCIples
Determining the limits of  state jurisdiction based on the system of  existing 
jurisdictional rules is currently counter-effective. Patching a leaky system by means 
of  ex post political arrangements does not solve the problems that 21st century 
14 Eduard Treppoz, “Jurisdiction in Cyberspace” (2016) 26 Swiss Rev Int’l E L 273, 275.
15 Tallin (n 2) 179; Wojciech Burek, Zastrzeżenia do traktatów z dziedziny praw człowieka (Instytut Wy-
dawczniczy EuroPrawo 2012) 45; Anne Clunan, “Redefining Sovereignty: Humanitarianism’s 
Challenge to Sovereign Immunity” in Noha Shawki and Meacheline Cox (eds), Negotiating Sover-
eignty and Human Rights: Actors and Issues in Contemporary Human Rights Politics (Padstow 2009) 7–27; 
Jean L Cohen, Globalization and Sovereignty: Rethinking Legality, Legitimacy, and Constitutionalism (CUP 
2012) 159–78; Dominik Zając, Odpowiedzialność karna za czyny popełnione za granicą (KIPK and 
Wolters Kluwer 2017) 246; Oona A Hathaway, “International Delegation and State Sovereignty” 
(2008) 71 Law & Contemp Probs 115, 145–8; Stephen D Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy 
(Princeton University Press 1999) 125; Robert Jackson, Sovereignty: The Evolution of  an Idea (CUP 
2007) 114–34. The above trend was reflected in the case law of  the ICTY, in which it was noted: 
„the impetuous development and propagation in the international community of  human rights 
doctrines, particularly after the adoption of  the Universal Declaration of  Human Rights in 1948, 
has brought about significant changes in international law, notably in the approach to problems 
besetting the world community. A State-sovereignty-oriented approach has been gradually sup-
planted by a human-being-oriented approach. Gradually the maxim of  Roman law hominum causa 
omne jus constitutum est (all law is created for the benefit of  human beings) has gained a firm foothold 
in the international community as well.” – Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic a/k/a “Dule”, Decision on the De-
fence Motion or Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Decision of  2 October 1995, <http://www.icty.org/x/
cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm> (accessed 5 November 2018).
16 Greg Y Sato, “Should Congress Regulate Cyberspace” (1997) 20 Hastings Comm & Ent LJ 699, 
716–7.
17 Jedynie jako przykład wskazac należy tutaj na sprawe Cuttinga – see John B Moore, Report on 
Extraterritorial Crime and the Cutting Case (United States Department of  State 1887).
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societies face in this respect.18 Two major defects exist in the traditional system. 
First, recourse to jurisdictional rules does not allow for a categorical ex ante 
determination, i.e., at the moment of  making decisions about a given behaviour, 
of  the content of  the norm binding the perpetrator. Second, it is not possible to 
sensibly weigh these principles and, consequently, to determine the content of  the 
law in force.
a. laCk of reCognIsaBIlIty of tHe jurIsdICtIonal BasIs at tHe 
moment of aCtIon or omIssIon of IndIVIdual
Traditional jurisdictional rules describe the powers of  the state without a 
consistent separation between prospective and responsive competences.19 The first 
group of  competences decide on the possibility of  shaping future behaviour of  
perpetrators.20 The second group allow punishing the individual in the case of  
breaking the law, which regulates his or her behaviour.21
The first group includes the competence to set regulatory norms.22 Thus, 
the state influences how people behave, indicating, for example, that one should 
move to the right side of  the road and should not download illegal software from 
the network. This competence is prospective because it is not an answer to a past 
event but rather is supposed to model future behaviour. The second group includes 
the right to punish. It has a responsive character and allows only a subsequent 
reaction to a past event (crime). For the modelling of  future behaviours to be 
possible, it must be possible to determine the content of  the standard binding the 
entity at the moment of  action or omission.23 The criterion of  the application of  
a norm in space must therefore be based on an element of  social situations that is 
recognisable ex ante. 
Not all of  the proposed rules meet the above criteria. Some of  them refer, 
for example, to the place in which the effects of  behaviour or financial gain occur.24 
18 Edward Lee, “Rules and Standards for Cyberspace” (2002) 77 Notre Dame L Rev 1275, 1279, 
1281; Kulesza (n 2) 30; Zekos (n 13) 15; Jennifer Daskal, “Borders and Bits” (2018) 79 Vand L 
Rev 179, 222; Jennifer Daskal, “The Un-Territoriality of  Data” (2015) 124 Yale L J 326, 330; Uta 
Kohl, Jurisdiction and the Internet (CUP 2007) 59.
19 Extraterritorial (n 4) 458. The document indicates the following: “Legislative jurisdiction and judicial 
jurisdiction coincide in the case of  criminal law. The national courts apply, in principle even with 
respect to offences which may have been committed outside national territory”.
20 Edward Lee (n 18) 1314; C Alchourron, E Bulygin, Normative Systems, (Springer 1971) 42.
21 Hans Kelsen, “The Pure Theory of  Law and Analytical Jurisprudence” in What is Justice? Justice, 
Law and Politics in the Mirror of  Science (University of  California Press 1971) (1957) 275.
22 Zhang Xinbao, Xu Ke, “A Study on Cyberspace Sovereignty” (2016) 4 China Legal Sci 33, 59.
23 Kohl (n 18) 116.
24 Ryngaert (n 5) 76; Hafen (n 6) 216; Extraterritorial (n 4) 446; Treppoz (n 14) 279.
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Considering the nature of  these circumstances, the perpetrator might not even be 
able to predict whether the effects will occur in the geographical space of  another 
state. 
The inability to recognise the content of  the norm at the moment of  action 
excludes the possibility of  its use in the process of  assessing the behaviour of  the 
perpetrator. This limitation not only results from the principle of  nullum crimen sine 
lege25 but also finds a deeper practical justification. It is impossible to require a 
certain behaviour from someone but at the same time not give him a chance to 
recognise what the behaviour should be. Therefore, at the level of  defining the 
scope of  competence for standardisation, it is necessary to reject all of  those 
jurisdictional principles that are based on future and uncertain circumstances.
B. laCk of possIBIlIty to weIgH tHe prInCIples of jurIsdICtIon
Even when, based on the realities of  a given social situation, it is possible to 
determine which jurisdictional principle is applicable, doing so will not eliminate 
the conflict of  jurisdiction.26 In international law, there is no universally accepted 
hierarchy in this respect.27 In the case of  the Lotus tanker,28 the Permanent Court 
of  International Justice has unequivocally indicated that the only circumstance 
limiting the state’s exercise of  competence is the sovereignty of  other states and 
25 Mohamed Shahabuddeen, “Does the Principle of  Legality Stand in the Way of  Progressive Devel-
opment of  Law?” (2004) 2 J Int’l Crim Just 1007, 1008; Franz von Liszt, “The Rationale for the 
Nullum Crimen Principle” (2010) 5 J Int’l Crim Just 1010.
26 Jack L Goldsmith, “Against Cyberanarchy” (1999) 40 University of  Chicago Law Occasional 
Paper, 1, 16.
27 Ryngaert (n 5) 271; Florian Jessberger, W Kaleck, Concurring Criminal Jurisdictions under International 
Law, The European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR), <https://www.ecchr.eu/
fileadmin/Gutachten/Expert_Opinion_Concurrent_Jurisdictions_en_Verantwortung_Voelk-
erstraftaten.pdf> (accessed 5 November 2018); General principles of  international criminal law, ICRC 
Advisory Service on International Humanitarian Law, <https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/2014/
general-principles-of-criminal-icrc-eng.pdf> (accessed 5 November 2018), 1; Tallin (n 2) 56.
28 Lotus Case, Publications of  the Permanent Court of  International Justice. Series A.-No. 70, September 7th, 
1927, Collection Of  Judgments, The Case of  the S.S. LOTUS, <https://www.icj-cij.org/files/perma-
nent-court-of-international-justice/serie_A/A_10/30_Lotus_Arret.pdf> (accessed 5 November 
2018); Schmitt and Vihul (n 2) 1650.
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the binding norms of  international law.29 In practice, this ruling means that in the 
event of  a conflict of  jurisdiction, diplomatic pressure and the speed of  the state’s 
actions are crucial. There are no precise criteria that would allow us to clearly 
state which country has a stronger power to regulate. The victim of  the above 
situation is first an individual who remains in a situation of  uncertainty—even 
when it is determined which jurisdictional principles apply to his or her activity. A 
person who resides in the territory of  Germany who downloads data protected by 
copyright from a site whose content is stored on servers located in the United States 
will thus not be able to determine which law is binding on him or her. Moreover, 
to demonstrate their own competence in the field of  regulation and criminalisation 
of  behaviour, both Germany and the US will invoke the principle of  territoriality 
in its objective variant.30 
Thus, application of  the traditional jurisdictional principles does not allow 
for the resolution of  the fundamental problems associated with the method of  
attributing responsibility for crimes of  a cross-border nature.
IV. jurIsdICtIonal lInks as arguments for tHe exIstenCe of state 
CompetenCe
In the doctrine of  international law, the thesis according to which state 
competences are limited only by the sovereignty of  other entities and the binding 
norms of  international law is commonly accepted.31 It is most clearly expressed in 
the Lotus judgment already discussed. These powers of  the state are derived from 
sovereignty. From the perspective of  the present study, the most important of  them 
29 Lotus Case (n 28): “It does not, however, follow that international law prohibits a State from 
exercising jurisdiction in its own territory, in respect of  any case which relates to acts which have 
taken place abroad, and in which it cannot rely on some permissive rule of  international law. 
Such a view would only be tenable if  international law contained a general prohibition to States 
to extend the application of  their laws and the jurisdiction of  their courts to persons, property and 
acts ‘outside their territory, and if, as an exception to this general prohibition, it allowed States to 
do so in certain specific cases. But this is certainly not the case under international law as it stands 
at present. Far from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that States may not extend the 
application of  their laws and the jurisdiction of  their courts to persons, property and acts outside 
their territory, it leaves them in this respect a wide measure of  discretion which is only limited 
in certain cases by prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every State remains free to adopt the 
principles which it regards as best and most suitable”. See also: Ryngaert (n 5) 22–6; Christopher 
Greenwood, “Sovereignty: A View from the International Bench” in Richard Rawlings, Peter Ley-
land and Alison Young, Sovereignty and the Law: Domestic, European and International Perspectives (OUP 
2013) 258; Roman Kwiecień, Teoria i filozofia prawa międzynarodowego (Difin 2011) 115.
30 Extraterritorial (n 4) 446; Hannah L Buxbaum, “Territory, Territoriality, and the Resolution of  
Jurisdictional Conflict” (2009) Articles by Maurer Faculty, Paper 132, 642; David G Post, “Against 
“Against Cyberanarchy” (2002) 17 Berkeley Tech LJ 1365, 1381; Daskal, The Un-Territoriality (n 
18) 326; Kohl (n 18) 11.
31 Zając (n 15) 73.
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are the right to regulate behaviours32 and the right to impose punishment on an 
individual.33 Together, they constitute the law of  punishment (ius puniendi).34 The 
state can prohibit specific behaviour under the threat of  punishment (regulatory 
aspect ius puniendi) and punish a person breaking this prohibition (repressive, 
procedural aspect of  ius puniendi). The two competences are coupled together such 
that the imposition of  punishment is possible only when the behaviour of  the 
offender constitutes a violation of  the law binding him or her at the moment and 
place of  action or omission.
To effectively enforce the law, the state tries to show that a given social 
situation influences the interpersonal relationships under its protection.35 This 
approach is the surest means of  avoiding the accusation that its actions interfere 
with the sphere of  exclusive rights of  other states. If  a given situation is connected, 
even non-exclusively, with the X-state, then it cannot be said that the state of  Y has 
exclusive power over it. For this purpose, the state refers to the existence of  certain 
elements of  social situations which, from the perspective of  international law, 
testify to the relationship that exists between them and the social situation. These 
elements (e.g., territory and citizenship) are referred to as jurisdictional links.36 
They form the basis for validation arguments (regulatory aspect) and penalisation 
arguments (repressive aspect). The more important the relationship becomes the 
stronger will be the state’s claim to set the norm or punish violation of  the law.
In addition to the interests of  particular states, in the process of  defining the 
limits of  spatial effectiveness of  norms, it is necessary to consider the individual’s 
rights. The individual has its own interests, the existence of  which has been 
recognised and which are protected by the international system of  human rights 
protection.37 Therefore, these interests must be considered in the frames of  the 
32 Willis L M Reese, “Legislative Jurisdiction” (1978) 78 Colum L Rev 1587; Austen L Parrish, 
“Evading Legislative Jurisdiction” (2013) 87 Notre Dame L Rev 1673, 1677; John H Knox, “A 
Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality” (2010) 104 Am J Int’l L 351, 355; John H Knox, 
“Legislative Jurisdiction, Judicial Canons, and International Law” (2009) 100 Wake Forest Univ 
Legal Studies Paper No. 1349127, 2.
33 Anthony Duff, “Responsibility, Citizenship and Criminal Law” in Anthony Duff & Suart Green 
(eds), Philosophical Foundations of  Criminal Law (OUP 2011) 127.
34 Extraterritorial (n 4) 456; Tomasz Ostropolski, Zasada jurysdykcji uniwersalnej w prawie międzynarodowym 
(Instytut Wydawczniczy EuroPrawo 2008) 20; Michał Płachta, Jurysdykcja państwa w sprawach 
karnych wobec cudzoziemców (1992) 111/112 Studia Prawnicze 98. 
35 Kohl (n 18) 20.
36 Treppoz (n 14) 275; Marek Wasiński, Jurysdykcja legislacyjna państwa w prawie międzynaro-
dowym publicznym, (2002) 673 Państwo i Prawo 56, 61; Knox, Legislative (n 32) 102; Kohl (n 18) 
15.
37 Hathaway (n 15) 146; Cohen (n 15) 178–9; Alette Smeulers and Fred Grünfeld, International Crimes 
and Other Gross Human Rights Violations: A Multi- and Interdisciplinary Textbook (Brill Nijhoff 2011) 7; 
Jackson (n 15) 124.
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validation and penalisation discourses. The individual has the right to become 
acquainted with the content of  the binding law. He or she has also a right to act 
within the limits of  a compatible legal system.38 Any ambiguity with respect to the 
validity of  standards cannot have negative consequences for the individual. This 
requirement is particularly emphasised in the case of  criminal law regulations. To 
this extent, the values protected by human rights are the basis of  negative validation 
or penalisation arguments. They do not support the claim of  any sovereign entity, 
but only block some of  them—in the event of  their being contrary to the content 
of  human rights.
Only the joint consideration of  positive and negative penalisation and 
validation arguments allows us to determine whether a given country has the 
power to regulate a given social situation or to punish a violation of  law.
a. ConCept of jurIsdICtIonal lInks and tHe speCIfICIty of 
BeHaVIour undertaken In CyBerspaCe
The discursive approach39 outlined above can be successfully applied 
in defining the limits of  state authority over the behaviour of  the Internet. To 
this end, certain specific features of  social situations that occur in cyberspace are 
considered.
The central point for considering the scope of  jurisdiction of  a state is the 
individual’s behaviour and its consequences,40 referred to collectively as the social 
situation. Such a “social situation” is a phenomenon occurring in a space-time 
composed of  many elements. Some of  them can constitute a relationship between 
the social situation and the state (they are referred to above as jurisdictional links). 
The implementation of  the behaviour using the Internet does not modify the above 
38 Beth Van Schaack, “Crimen Sine Lege: Judicial Lawmaking at the Intersection of  Law and Mor-
als” (2008) 97 Geo LJ 119, 172–88; Shahram Dana, “Beyond Retroactivity to Realizing Justice: A 
Theory on the Principle of  Legality in International Criminal Law Sentencing” (2008–2009) 99 J 
Crim L & Criminology 857, 867.
39 Andrzej Grabowski, Juristic Concept of  the Validity of  Statutory Law A Critique of  Contemporary Legal 
Nonpositivism (Springer 2013) 455. 
40 The perception of  the Internet network as a separate space should be rejected—this approach 
does not explain anything, at the same time making it difficult to rationally assess the relationship 
between behaviour and the state seeking to normalize or punish. In the literature, it is rightly rec-
ommended to move away from the metaphor of  “space” for Internet infrastructure. On the basis 
of  this study, the term “cyberspace” is used only as a shorthand, describing the social situations 
that are undertaken with the usage of  the Internet infrastructure. See Dan Hunter, “Cyberspace 
as Place and the Tragedy of  the Digital Anticomons” (2003) 91 California Law Review 439, 
447–52; Treppoz (n 14) 280.
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perspective.41 Additionally, in the case of  Internet crimes, the state’s competences 
are limited to exerting a specific influence on the behaviour of  individuals. The 
point of  reference is not cyberspace42 but rather the social situation—or, more 
broadly, the crime in which the individual takes part. Cyberspace as such is not 
subject to regulation—just as the seas are not regulated—but rather only the 
behaviour of  seafarers sailing on ships.43 
The use of  cyberspace for undertaking behaviours, however, results in 
the transformation of  the social meaning of  the elements of  a social situation 
that constitutes jurisdictional links. It is possible to indicate here three important 
modifications.
First, as a rule, in the case of  cybercrimes, the physical location of  the 
perpetrator is different from where the socially significant effect of  their operation 
occurs.44 In the pre-Internet era, the behaviour of  the perpetrator affected above all 
the people around him. Hence, the territory in which he undertook the behaviour 
was a very important jurisdictional link. Currently, the fact of  commission might 
be invisible to nearby surroundings. A link in the form of  the place that a behaviour 
occurs therefore loses its significance.
Second, the range of  the social effects of  crime is now widening, becoming 
available to a wide and undefined number of  potential recipients.45 An example is 
that placing illegal software on a public Internet server has social effects in many 
41 Such approach is widely represented in the literature. See inter alia: Goldsmith (n 26) 32: “Trans-
actions in cyberspace involve real people in one territorial jurisdiction either (i) transacting with 
real people in other territorial jurisdictions or (ii) engaging in activity in one jurisdiction that 
causes real-world effects in another territorial jurisdiction. To this extent, activity in cyberspace is 
functionally identical to transnational activity mediated by other means, such as mail or telephone 
or smoke signal.”. See also: Joel P Trachtman, “Cyberspace, Sovereignty, Jurisdiction, and Mod-
ernism” (1998) 5 Indiana Journal of  Global Legal Studies 561, 568. In opposition, see: Post (n 30) 
1365.
42 There is also a different approach in the literature, see, among others: Zekos (n 13) 1–2.
43 The metaphor of  the sea is very often used to describe cyberspace, see, among others: Treppoz (n 
14) 273–4; Kohl (n 18) 40; Kulesza (n 2) 19.
44 Michael E O’Neil, “Old Crimes in New Bottles: Sanctioning Cybercrime” (2009) 9 Geo Mason L 
Rev 237 263.
45 Zekos (n 13) 6; Mike Keyser, “The Council of  Europe Convention on Cybercrime” (2003) 12 J 
Transnational Law & Policy 287, 294.
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countries. This example, in turn, entails a situation in which many states can exert 
a claim to regulate or impose punishment for the behaviour of  the individual.
Third, a characteristic feature of  the behaviours undertaken on the Internet 
is the lack of  predictability of  the range of  consequences and of  their multiple 
locations. 
The change in the spatial scope of  the social effect of  the perpetrator’s 
behaviour and the unpredictability of  this scope entail the modification of  the 
scope of  state competences.46 The state claims the right to regulate or punish a 
given behaviour due to the influence that this behaviour has on social relationships 
covered by the protection of  that state. Although in the pre-Internet era, the 
physical presence of  the perpetrator determined the extent of  such influence, 
physical presence has marginal significance at present.
In the course of  the validation and penalisation discourse, traditional 
arguments (e.g., referring to the place of  behaviour) and characteristics for online 
realities (e.g., based on the location of  the server) are intertwined with each other. 
All of  them must be evaluated from the perspective of  the interests they describe. 
Thus, one can formulate reasonable arguments— subject to weighing and 
considering the interests of  both states and individuals—in isolation from rigid 
jurisdiction rules.
The adoption of  the above approach appears justified for two reasons.
First, in the absence of  a set hierarchy of  jurisdictional principles, entering 
individual elements of  the social situation into their content is pointless. Doing 
so only leads to the blurring of  the differences between important and negligible 
social interests. At the same time, it does not constitute any added value.
Second, one cannot lose sight of  the issue considered here, which concerns 
the power of  the state over the individual. The discursive approach allows for the 
inclusion of  negative arguments based on the values recognised by international 
law, which are protected by human rights.
The use of  a single category (an interest) instead of  many jurisdictional 
principles allows for the construction of  universal and more-flexible validation and 
penalisation arguments. Determining the interests that underlie such arguments 
enables the meaningful weighing of  such arguments. Bearing in mind the above, 
it appears necessary to transfer the analysis from the level of  principles to the level 
of  jurisdictional links (interests). 
Further considerations are addressed from the perspective of  the two 
functions that these links perform in the process of  introducing and enforcing 
penal regulations. First, from the perspective of  competence to legislate (legislative 
jurisdiction), they are elements of  validation arguments decisive for the effectiveness 
46 See inter alia Daskal, Borders (n 18) 185–6.
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of  norms binding the individual. Second, in terms of  the right to enforce the law (ius 
puniendi sensu stricto), they justify extending court jurisdiction to the perpetrator and 
imposing a penalty on him under the majesty of  law. Such distinction is important 
because in the doctrine of  criminal law, the distinction between the validation 
and penalisation arguments is often omitted. This omission, in turn, results in the 
transfer of  structures based on the fiction of  the place committing the act (effective 
territoriality)—which constitutes an element of  penal argumentation—to the 
plane of  validation.
B. jurIsdICtIonal lInks as ValIdatIon arguments
A feature of  a legal norm is validity.47 The fact that the standard is in 
force implies an obligation of  the individual to proceed in a certain manner, as 
described in the standard. The question of  whether (and to what extent) a given 
sentence of  a directive character is binding is determined by the validation grounds 
(arguments).48 Indication can be made here to establish a norm in accordance 
with the procedure,49 but also—most important from the perspective of  the 
considerations discussed here—acting within the limits of  the competence of  the 
state.50 Such limits are defined precisely by referring to jurisdictional links.
To regulate a given social situation, the legislator uses the following 
(simplified) argumentation. 
1. A potential social situation X is characterised by a connection 
with the state of  Y either because the individual performing 
the behaviour is a citizen of  state Y; because behaviour leads 
to interaction with the citizens of  state Y; or because the place 
of  behaviour is the territory of  state Y. 
2. Hence, the potential social situation of  X remains within the 
competence of  the State of  Y. 
3. Thus, state Y has the right to regulate how the individual shall 
behave in the potential social situation of  X.
To make a reasonable decision about the spatial scope of  the norm, it is 
necessary to construct such a validation argument, which is effective at least when 
47 Kelsen (n 21) 267. 
48 Grabowski (n 39) 445; Zając (n 15) 38. 
49 Grabowski (n 39) 489.
50 Zając (n 15) 39.
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the perpetrator behaves.51 Because the norm is to provide specific instructions 
to an individual, its content cannot remain undefined for the moment of  action 
or omission. Enforcement of  law against an individual is not meant to build the 
state’s international position but rather to regulate social relationships. Such an 
approach translates directly into the criteria for the admissibility of  validation 
arguments raised in the discourse. They can only be based on circumstances that 
are recognisable to a model citizen at the time of  his or her behaviour.
Recognition does not mean, however, the existence of  such a circumstance 
at the moment of  action or omission. In practice, however, it is occasionally possible 
to predict future interference that will occur with high certainty. This accuracy will 
occur in two cases.
First, the perpetrator acting outside the territory of  state X makes a targeted 
attack on objects located in its territory.52 For example, knowing where the server is 
located and who owns the data, a hacker might try to break into an Internet server 
located in the US to destroy important data and cause harm to the property of  an 
American firm.
Second, the act of  the perpetrator can, by its very nature, be associated 
with the induction of  a specific consequence, the extraterritorial nature of  which 
will be highly probable. For example, a person can create an online auction in 
which one can buy material promoting Nazism,53 and the auction website will be 
available from anywhere in the world. In both cases, it will be possible to determine 
at the moment of  behaviour that the behaviour of  the perpetrator will affect the 
social situation of  another country. In these cases, constructing a valid validation 
argument is not excluded, because of  predictability of  circumstances, which 
constitutes a jurisdictional link.
In contrast, all elements of  a social situation whose future occurrence is 
not predictable for a model citizen cannot form the basis of  an effective validation 
argument. Because the content of  the norm is to shape the perpetrator’s behaviour, 
51 Carly Henek, “Exercise of  Personal Jurisdiction Based on Internet Web Sites” (2000) 15 St John’s 
Journal of  Legal Commentary 139, 145; Scott Isaacson, “Finding Something More in Targeted 
Cyberspace Activities”, (2016) 68 Rutgers U L Rev 905, 914.
52 Cindy Chen, “United States and European Union Approaches to Internet Jurisdiction and Their 
Impact on E-Commerce” (2004) 25 U Pa J Int’l L 423, 431; Treppoz (n 14) 282; Emily Lan-
za, “Personal Jurisdiction Based on Internet Conracts” (2000) 24 Suffolk Transnational L Rev 
125, 127; Calder v Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984) <http://cdn.loc.gov/service/ll/usrep/usrep465/
usrep465783/usrep465783.pdf> (accessed 5 November 2018); Suomputer Law Review and Tech-
nology Journal 2003, vol. VIII at 51; Frank B Arenas, “Cyberspace Jurisdiction and the Implica-
tions of  Sealand” (2003) 88 Iowa L Rev 1165, 1186; Isaacson (n 51) 919. 
53 Yahoo! Inc. v La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’antisemitisme 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006) <https://case-
law.findlaw.com/us-9th-circuit/1144098.html> (accessed 5 November 2018) (Yahoo! v LICRA). See 
also: Allen (n 3) 70–5; Hathaway (n 15) 1186; Kohl (n 18) 93.
Criminal Jurisdiction over the Internet14
its validity must be based on such relationships between deed and territory; that is, 
they must be noticeable ex ante.
The catalogue of  validation arguments (jurisdictional links) is open. Nothing 
prevents a state from claiming to regulate a given social situation, for example, 
because that situation is connected with a high probability of  causing some type of  
effect within its territory.54 International law does not introduce any limits in this 
area. Many states might theoretically invoke many different elements of  the same 
social situation and, on this basis, make claims to regulate this situation.
C. jurIsdICtIonal lInks as penal arguments
The occurrence of  jurisdictional links also justifies the imposition of  
punishment on a person who has committed violations of  the applicable law. The 
state claims the competence to punish specific behaviours because of  the negative 
effect they had on the social relationships under its protection. In this case, the state 
does not fulfil the right to normalise the social situation but only the competences 
to perform the functions of  criminal law: retributive, compensatory, and protective 
functions.55
In the case of  ius puniendi, the argumentation for the existence of  competences 
on the side of  the state is constructed a little differently:
1. An act of  perpetrator X is characterised by a relationship with state 
Y either because the perpetrator X is a citizen of  state Y; because the 
act violates the interests of  state Y or interests protected by state Y; 
or because the place of  committing the act or its consequences is the 
territory of  state Y. 
2. Hence, the act of  perpetrator X remains within the competence of  
the State of  Y. 
3. Thus, state Y has the right to impose punishment on the perpetrator 
X.
As a social phenomenon, crime is not limited to the behaviour of  the 
perpetrator. It consists of  several other circumstances, such as the result or the 
fact of  victimisation, which have a subsequent nature. Although they influence the 
54 Chen (n 52) 435.
55 Jan Jodłowski, Zasada prawdy materialnej w postępowaniu karnym. Analiza w perspektywie funkcji prawa 
karnego (Wolters Kluwer 2015) 248–312; Christopher W Mullins and Dawn L Rothe, “The Ability 
of  the International Criminal Court to Deter Violations of  International Criminal Law: A Theo-
retical Assessment” (2010) 10 Int’l Crim L Rev 771, 776–84; Peer Stolle, Tobias Singelnstein “On 
the Aims and Actual Consequences of  International Prosecution of  Human Rights Crimes” in 
Tobias Singelnstein et al (eds), International Prosecution of  Human Rights Crimes (Springer 2007) 38–56; 
George P Fletcher, Basic Concepts of  Criminal Law (OUP 1998) 12.
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assessment of  the behaviour of  the perpetrator, they are not completely dependent 
upon him from the perspectives of  place and time.
Responding to the need for punishment, the state acts reactively to the 
behaviour that has already occurred. There is no need to regulate the behaviour 
of  the perpetrator ex ante (in fact, doing so is impossible), but only to apply to 
that behaviour an appropriate means of  response, ensuring the implementation 
of  the criminal law function (ex post perspective). The social situation lost its 
potential character and became real. All important elements that can indicate the 
relationship of  the event with the state have occurred and are possible to prove. 
There is no uncertainty, which was an inseparable feature of  a potential social 
situation.
Creating penalisation arguments based on circumstances that are not 
recognised by the perpetrator ex ante does not necessarily mean excessive restriction 
of  the rights of  the individual. The condition for imposing a penalty is to show 
that the perpetrator act was an infringement of  the law binding him at the time 
of  the action or omission.56 For this purpose, it is necessary to perform validation 
argumentation to determine the content of  the norm regulating a given behaviour. 
If  it is determined that the perpetrator had the right to behave as he behaved, 
imposition of  punishment will be impossible. Individual legal systems even 
introduce special legal instruments, collectively referred to as the requirement 
of  double criminality. It follows from the above that each state can exercise its 
competences to a large extent but only on the condition that the basis for its 
assessment will be a standard coinciding with the norm binding the individual at 
the time of  action.
V. jurIsdICtIonal lInks InCluded In tHe jurIsdICtIonal prInCIples  
as ValIdatIon and penalIsatIon arguments
Analysing the normative content of  the jurisdictional principles shaping the 
scope of  the criminal jurisdiction of  individual states, it is possible to derive those 
elements of  social situations from them that are in fact jurisdictional links.57 To 
switch from a model based on principles to a discursive model, which is based on 
56 Zając (n 15) 260.
57 See also: Daskal, Borders (n 18) 227.
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weighing the significance of  links, it is necessary to extract the jurisdictional links 
from the jurisdictional principles.
a. terrItorIalIty prInCIple
The basis of  the principle of  territoriality is the space in which an act is 
committed or, more broadly, a crime occurs. Thus, the territory plays the role of  a 
jurisdictional link. In the course of  development, the principle of  territoriality has 
lost its homogeneous character. Currently, its two variants are distinguished: simple 
and effective.58 
In the case of  the simple variant of  the territoriality principle, the territory 
is understood as a place of  a presence of  the perpetrator at the time of  his act 
or omission. From this perspective, a person who from his flat in Berlin publishes 
paedophile content on an American server commits his or her action on the 
territory of  Germany. The link in the form of  territory thus understood constitutes 
an extremely strong basis for validation and penalisation arguments. The state, 
as a sovereign entity, has as a rule the right to supervise all aspects of  social life 
that occur within its borders.59 In the pre-Internet era, the effects of  the crimes 
committed above all affected the closest surroundings of  the place in which the 
perpetrator acted. Thus, the place of  action or omission coincided with the place in 
which the public order was breached. These points all speak in favour of  granting 
a territorial connection a very significant meaning. Not without significance is the 
fact that a territorial connection is also characterised by the highest stability and 
recognisability.
In addition to the principle of  territoriality in a simple approach in the 
doctrine of  international law, the principle of  effective territoriality also developed.60 
The jurisdictional link in the form of  territory is understood here as the place in 
which the consequences of  a specific act or abandonment of  the perpetrator occur. 
In this case, the states use the fiction of  committing an act on their own territory, 
citing other circumstances than the place of  the perpetrator’s physical presence.61 
Classically defined territoriality refers to one circumstance—the presence 
of  the individual in space. Within this approach, there can be no conflict of  
jurisdictions—science does not address cases of  bilocation. The case of  effective 
territoriality is different; the relationship between crime and state is to be 
58 August (n 3) 537; Ryngaert (n 5) 76; Keyser (n 45) 300; Hathaway (n 15) 1840; Kohl (n 18) 24.
59 Extraterritorial (n 4) 446; Treppoz (n 14) 275; Zekos (n 13) 7; Kriangsak Kittichaisaree, Public Interna-
tional Law of  Cyberspace (Springer 2017) 24.
60 Tallin (n 2) 57; Hafen (n 6) 216; Extraterritorial (n 4) 446; Ireland-Piper (n 5) 78; Post (n 30) 1381–4; 
Podgor (n 11) 730; Kohl (n 18) 89–94.
61 Ryngaert (n 5) 75.
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demonstrated by the occurrence of  a specific effect in its territory. Such criteria 
are extremely diverse. For example, such an occurrence might take the form of, 
among others, the place of  damage,62 the location of  the server on which the data 
are stored,63 or the availability of  certain content posted on the Internet from the 
territory of  the state.64
The diverse nature of  the elements that constitute the principle of  
territoriality in its effective approach will affect the diversification of  the strength 
of  the validation and penal arguments based on them (the method of  weighing 
them will be presented in the last part of  the work).
As indicated above, the essential feature of  the jurisdictional link constituting 
the basis of  the validation argument is its recognisability at the moment of  
undertaking the behaviour. Such a circumstance is certainly a place to evaluate the 
behaviour.65 However, there is a serious doubt concerning whether these elements 
of  the social situation can be treated similarly. This doubt forms the basis for 
links drawn from the principle of  effective territoriality. They are subsequent to 
behaviour. Here, the important element connecting behaviour with the territory 
is the change actually caused by the perpetrator’s previous behaviour. For obvious 
reasons, previous behaviour cannot be simultaneous with the behaviour itself. The 
circumstance that underpins the principle of  effective territoriality often cannot be 
the basis for an effective validation argument.
Circumstances derived from the content of  the principle of  effective 
territoriality, however, can successfully co-create penalisation arguments. The 
essence of  a crime is to do evil, which is its consequence. The enforcement of  
the punishment is subsequent to the act. It only requires demonstrating that the 
behaviour has had a specific effect on internal social relationships. The space 
that this evil affects is a very important point of  reference from the perspective 
of  criminal law objectives. After all, it is the community of  this place that has 
been harmed, and it is the prerogative of  the community to satisfy the sense of  
justice. The stronger the influence of  the crime on a given country’s population, 
the stronger the claim to impose a penalty for it.
B. personalIty prInCIple
The basis of  the personality principle is the relationship existing between 
the individual and the state. That relationship has an autonomous character 
and is independent of  the place in which an individual is at the time of  action 
62 Chen (n 52) 435; Treppoz (n 14) 276. 
63 See inter alia: Goldsmith (n 26) 21. 
64 Yahoo! v LICRA (n 53).
65 Kohl (n 18) 144.
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or omission. The personal bond is considered here from the perspective of  the 
relationship between the addressee of  the norm and the state.66 The person against 
whom the state claims the right to regulate behaviour or impose punishment must 
have a feature that testifies to its relationship with the state exercising competences. 
In fact, every state claims a competence to exercise to some extent power over 
individuals who have a special relationship with them. One aspect of  this approach 
is the extension of  state authority to individuals’ behaviour abroad.67 States thus 
discipline their citizens or other dependent individuals.
In the case of  the analysed link, there is a noticeable difference between 
its significance as an element of  the validation argument and the significance of  a 
penalising argument based on it.
A personal relationship can become the basis for a validation argument. Its 
existence is recognisable ex ante—the person executing the behaviour will usually 
be aware of  his nationality or permanent residence. However, this argument is 
relatively weak. In most cases, in the course of  a validation discourse, it will give 
way to an argument based on a territory connector. It is impossible to imagine 
that a person travelling from State X to the State of  Y would somehow transfer 
the entire legal system binding that person in his homeland. One cannot require 
the person to, for example, drive the vehicle with the left hand in right-hand traffic 
(this point is important, for example, in determining who is the perpetrator of  a car 
accident). Behaviour must be consistent with how the community operates.
In practice, however, there will be a certain group of  norms, the 
extraterritorial effectiveness of  which will be possibly based on the personal 
link. They refer to situations in which the behaviour of  the individual is morally 
reprehensible from the perspective of  the value system of  the forum state and at the 
same time constitutes an expression of  an individual decision of  the perpetrator 
(and is not the result of  necessary involvement due to, for example, the nature of  
social life). Such situations include, for example, acts of  a paedophile nature, from 
which the state will be able to ban its citizens.68
The significance of  the penal argument based on personal bond is different. 
The argumentation for extending the law is additionally strengthened by various 
circumstances. The community has a strong need to account for the evil performed 
66 Tallin (n 2) 62.
67 Lanza (n 52) 126; Ryngaert (n 5) 90; Hafen (n 6) 218; Titi Nguyen, “A Survey of  Personal Juris-
diction Based on Internet Activity: A Return to Tradition”, (2004) 19 Berkeley Tech LJ 519, 520; 
Keyser (n 45) 315; According to the Article 22 of  the Convention on Cybercrime. Reference, ETS 
No.185. Opening of  the treaty, Budapest, 23/11/2001: “Each Party shall adopt such legislative 
and other measures as may be necessary to establish jurisdiction over any offence established in 
accordance with Articles 2 through 11 of  this Convention, when the offence is committed: [...] by 
one of  its nationals, if  the offence is punishable under criminal law where it was committed or if  
the offence is committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of  any State”.
68 Keyser (n 45) 306.
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by a person who is part of  such a community. Moreover, in view of  the growing 
respect of  the principle of  ne bis in idem, associated with the ban on the issue of  own 
citizens,69 imposing a punishment is often the only instrument to satisfy the social 
sense of  justice. 
C. passIVe personalIty prInCIple
The principle of  passive personality is in a sense the reverse of  the principle 
of  active personality. In this case, the competence for regulating and imposing 
punishment is based on the relationship between the State and the entity whose 
good has been violated by the offense (victim). The point of  reference is here 
infringed legally protected values (life, health, property, but also the right to be 
forgotten),70 which can be linked to a specific state by a person who is a disposer 
of  such values (e.g., the owner of  a thing).71 The state claims the right to protect 
the interests of  entities that undertake their activities under the protection of  such 
state’s jurisdiction. The scope of  this protection is defined not only by the place of  
specific activity or passivity but also by the nationality of  the persona or the place 
of  registration of  the legal entity.72
The use of  the abovementioned personal link as the basis for the validation 
argument entails significant problems. The perpetrator until the moment of  action 
does not remain in any relationship with the forum state. At the same time, it 
is often unpredictable ex ante whose property will be involved in a given future 
social situation. In many cases, the perpetrator has no real opportunity to recognise 
the nationality of  the person with whom he or she engages in a specific social 
situation, e.g., proposing the presentation of  pornographic content. This ambiguity 
is particularly common in the case of  interaction in cyberspace, in which the 
principle is anonymity. Moreover, information distributed via the Internet 
influences an undefined group of  people, each of  whom can be subject to the 
protection of  a different legal system. Even when it is possible to unambiguously 
determine ex ante the circle of  entities to which a given information arrives, the 
question arises concerning the possibility of  a sensible solution towards which the 
state will have the competence to regulate such behaviour.
The doubts outlined above are missing if  the analysed link is considered the 
basis of  the penal argument. The claim to impose a penalty will be justified by the 
69 Ryngaert (n 5) 90; Extraterritorial (n 4) 448.
70 Daskal, Borders (n 18), 209. 
71 Watson (n 6) 18; Hafen (n 6) 218; McCarthy (n 6) 301; August (n 3) 541; Tallin (n 2) 64.
72 Extraterritorial (n 4) 451; Zając (n 15) 423.
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fact that the entity being under state protection is harmed.73 However, such claim 
is no longer as strong as in the case of  effective territoriality. The crime committed 
there indirectly affected the national public order. In the case of  a connector 
based on the “origin” of  a legal good, such a circumstance does not constitute a 
connecting entity.
d. proteCtIVe prInCIple
The protective principle is based on a jurisdictional link in the form of  
essential state interests.74 The criterion of  the disposer of  legally protected 
value, inscribed in the content of  the principle of  passive personality, is here 
supplemented with additional elements clarifying the character of  the good itself. 
In the classical approach, the analysed principle referred to those interests whose 
security conditions the existence of  the state as a sovereign political organism.75 In 
the second half  of  the twentieth century, individual countries also began to refer to 
the need to protect values of  a supra-individual character, whose security lies in the 
interest of  the state due to the benefits (for example, securing the market balance 
by prohibiting the corruption of  own entrepreneurs).76 
Depending upon the type of  interest appearing in a given social situation as 
the base of  the argument, the strength of  the validation or penalising argumentation 
is different.
The state has strong competences to normalise these behaviours, which are 
directed at interactions with legally recognised interests of  such a state.77 There 
is no doubt that state X is entitled to regulate the question of  addressing data on 
government servers or to determine the procedure for obtaining access to such 
data. Only state X is interested in the proper protection of  this sphere of  public 
life. At the same time, there will be no element of  uncertainty here in principle. 
73 Regula Echle, “The Passive Personality Principle and the General Principle of  Ne Bis In Idem” 
(2013) 9 Utrecht L Rev 56, 57. 
74 Extraterritorial (n 4) 451; Matthew Garrod, “The Protective Principle of  Jurisdiction over War 
Crimes and the Hollow Concept of  Universality” (2012) 12 International Criminal Law Review 
763, 776; Edward T. Meyer, “Drug Smuggling and the Protective Principle: A Journey Into Un-
charted Waters” (1979) 39 Louisiana L Rev 1189, 1190; Slomanson (n 5) 252; Tallin (n 2) 63.
75 Hafen (n 6) 217.
76 Extraterritorial (n 4) 454. The global nature of  the interests (legal goods) determined in this way 
means that in the analyzed scope the protection principle is sometimes identified with the principle 
of  universal jurisdiction. However, this approach does not seem legitimate. In the case of  a protec-
tive principle, the state relies on a supranational good and undertakes to establish specific regula-
tions in this respect. In the case of  a universal rule, these regulations are derived from customs and 
general principles of  law.
77 Extraterritorial (n 4) 451; Ryngaert (n 5) 97; Jared Beim, “Enforcing a Prohibition on International 
Espionage” (2018) 18 Chi J Int’l L 647, 670.
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State legal goods have a special character and thus are recognisable—for example, 
due to the domain address or by the introduction of  used signs (for example, by the 
official stamp “secret”).
The situation will be slightly different in the case of  supra-individual goods, 
somehow inscribed in the content of  the existing jurisdictional principle. They 
are not reflected in objectively perceived reality. A legal good such as “market 
equilibrium” lacks a tangible substrate, which can lead to a lack of  identifiability of  
the relevant link. Moreover, based on the jurisdictional link thus described, many 
states can claim the competence for regulation. In fact, no state is entitled to that 
competence more than another, because all states indicate the same jurisdictional 
link.
The doubts outlined above are weakened if  the link-based interest protected 
by the state is considered an element of  the penal argument. In both the case of  
state interest and those cases of  a transnational character, the state has a strong 
non-exclusive claim to impose a penalty. In the first case, that claim will result from 
the need to pay for the attack on the political organism. In the second country, the 
forum will appear on behalf  of  the international community interested in securing 
a particular interest.
e. VICarIous jurIsdICtIon
The essence of  the principle of  substitute criminalisation is to impose a 
punishment in the name of  the originally authorised state.78 Under this principle, 
the forum state imposes a penalty if  the perpetrator of  a crime committed abroad 
is currently on its territory.79 The circumstance that is the basis of  the competence, 
remain in the country—it is not related to the perpetrator’s behaviour itself, or even 
with its result. Therefore, the circumstance cannot be the basis for constructing an 
effective validation argument. 
A penal argument in fact refers to the element of  territory.80 In this case, the 
state grants itself  the power to punish the perpetrator due to the need to protect its 
own society and public order against further attacks by the perpetrator remaining 
78 Ryngaert (n 5) 102–3; Extraterritorial (n 4) 452.
79 Ryngaert (n 5) 106.
80 Michał Płachta, “Zastępcza represja karna w prawie polskim” in Piotr Hofmański and Kazimi-
erz Zgryzek (eds), Współczesne problemy procesu karnego i wymiaru sprawiedliwości: Księga ku czci Profesora 
Kazimierza Marszała (Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śláskiego 2003) 353.
Criminal Jurisdiction over the Internet22
within its borders. By imposing a punishment, the forum state also avoids the 
opinion of  a rogue state that provides protection to criminals.81 
f. unIVersal jurIsdICtIon
The tragic events of  the twentieth century brought a change in the 
perception of  the role of  states as guardians of  value. Although the state was 
primarily responsible for safeguarding interests in its “own backyard”, wars and 
humanitarian tragedies somehow forced states to change this approach.82 States 
have taken responsibility for protecting certain universally recognised values (basic 
moral values) against the most serious categories of  violations.83 Thus, recognition 
has acquired a new jurisdictional link that can be defined as “the universal interest 
of  the international community”.84
Considering this link, the basis for the validation and penalisation argument, 
unlike other jurisdictional linkers, one can impute the character of  prohibited or 
prescribed behaviour into the jurisdictional link itself. Each state has the right 
to punish committing genocide, for example.85 However, no state has the power 
to shape universal standards of  conduct in this respect; this point is described in 
international law.86 In this case, the role of  the state is basically only in the insertion 
of  a specific norm of  international law into national legal orders. The analysed link 
is therefore the basis for the penalisation argument.
VI. new jurIsdICtIonal lInks as ValIdatIon and penalIsatIon arguments
Observing the problem of  crime committed with the use of  the Internet, 
individual states began to claim the right to regulate and punish behaviour 
undertaken in cyberspace based on modified jurisdictional rules. This approach 
essentially meant extending the application of  the norms of  a given country by 
81 Beim (n 77) 660.
82 Mark Lewis, The Birth of  the New Justice: The Internationalization of  Crime and Punishment 1919-1950 
(OUP 2014) 80.
83 Ryngaert (n 5) 114; Ostropolski (n 34) 47–8. 
84 Ryngaert (n 5) 106, 114; The Princeton (n 10) 28; Hafen (n 6) 219; Bassiouni (n 4) 280.
85 Ryngaert (n 5) 116; Cynthia Sinatra, “The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugo-
slavia and the Application of  Genocide” (2005) 5 Int’l Crim L Rev 417, 417–8.
86 August (n 3) 542.
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reference to circumstances such as the location of  the server or the language of  the 
message being transmitted.87 
The considerations presented here discuss the possibility of  treating some 
of  the “new circumstances” as autonomous jurisdictional links.88 However, they are 
not comprehensive. The purpose of  the argument is to show that the circumstances 
can be described using dogmatic tools and subjected to rational weighing.
a. jurIsdICtIonal lInks related to Computer InfrastruCture
Some states claim the right to regulate those activities performed in 
cyberspace that use elements of  the IT infrastructure located on their territory. 
The claim is primarily indicated in this section for servers that collect data89 (e.g., 
illegal duplicate copies of  software) and transmission devices.90 
The presence of  devices used to commit an act is used to prove the 
relationship of  behaviour with the territory. This connection in turn allows us 
to construct effective validation and penalisation arguments, which refer to the 
interference of  behaviour in the internal relationships of  the state. The problem 
is, however, that the significance of  the social situation in cyberspace focuses on 
the sender and recipient of  information. The mere “storage” of  a digital record, 
often encrypted, does not interfere with social relationships that are protected by 
the state of  the server’s location.91 Not without significance is the fact that specific 
data can be stored simultaneously on many servers, located in different countries.92
The possibility of  using the location of  ICT infrastructure elements as a 
validation argument appears significantly limited due to the unpredictability of  the 
transmission route or the storage location. The average user of  the network will not 
even be able to determine the path of  data transfer or where they are physically 
stored.93
The possibility of  constructing penal arguments is slightly different. There 
will be no obstacles related to the lack of  predictability here. Both the location of  
87 Daskal, The Un-Territoriality (n 18) 355.
88 In the course of  deliberations, the technical aspects of  the Internet were omitted. In this respect, 
see, among others: Chen (n 52) 426–7.
89 Yahoo! v LICRA (n 53). See also: Chen (n 52) 447; Goldsmith (n 26) 21; Jennifer Daskal, “Law 
enforcement Access to Data Across the Borders: The Evolving Security and Rights Issues” (2016) 
8 J National Security Law & Policy 473, 490.
90 Hunter (n 40) 477; Zekos (n 13) 14; Daskal, Borders (n 18) 188; Daskal, The Un-Territoriality (n 
18) 326; O’Neil, (n 44) 254.
91 Daskal, The Un-Territoriality (n 18) 371.
92 Kirstern E. Eichensehr, “Data Extraterritoriality”, (2016) 95 Tex. L. Rev. 145, 145; Daskal, Bor-
ders (n 18) 223.
93 Burk, (n 2) 123; Zekos (n 13) 15; Daskal, The Un-Territoriality (n 18) 366; Grootes (n 12) 17: 
“There really is no “there” there in cyberspace, but mere geographic probabilities or uncertainty”. 
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servers and the means of  data transmission can be proved during the process.94 
Moreover, the state in which the server is located has the potential to effectively 
block illegal content—for example, in criminal proceedings.95
B. plaCe of domaIn regIstratIon
Some states try to extend their jurisdiction to domain registration criteria.96 
An example is the USA.97 Each webpage is referred to as an address ending in a 
so-called the top-level domain (TLD).98 Such domains are divided into domestic 
domains (for example, .pl and .de) and functional domains (for example, .com and 
.org). The management of  the TLD is performed by the ICANN organisation.99 
It has been established and operates in the US, giving the US real control over 
cyberspace.100 In addition, individual countries manage national domains to a 
certain extent by controlling national DNS servers.101
Considering the criterion of  the place of  domain registration an element 
of  the validation argument, wherever the address of  the website is connected to 
the functional domain, determining the place of  domain registration is virtually 
impossible or very difficult.102 Lack of  recognisability in this case excludes the 
possibility of  constructing validation arguments. When the website address is 
based on the national domain, prima facie it is possible to predict the country of  its 
registration.103 In each case, however, the circumstance creates a relatively small 
relationship between the social situation and the state. A given website operating 
based on a specific domain lacks any social significance. Behaviour that occurs 
with the use of  a specific domain does not interfere in principle with the internal 
relationships of  the state of  its registration.
Concerning penalisation arguments, nothing prevents such arguments from 
being constructed based on both the domestic and functional domains. However, 
the question concerning the power of  such arguments remains valid. This claim 
94 Xinbao, Ke (n 22) 43.
95 Zekos (n 13) 4.
96 Thomas R Lee, “In Rem Jurisdiction ind Cyberspace” (2000) 75 Wash L Rev 97, 116; Hathaway 
(n 15) 1827.
97 Edward Lee (n 18) 1332.
98 Thomas R Lee (n 96) 102.
99 Hunter (n 40) 479; Edward Lee (n 18) 1332; Xinbao, Ke (n 22) 43.
100 Xinbao, Ke (n 22) 51; Kulesza (n 2) 87.
101 Edward Lee (n 18) 1332; Thomas R Lee (n 96) 100.
102 Chen (n 52) 432; Hathaway (n 15) 1828.
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will be strengthened if  it is shown that the state in question has a real possibility of  
blocking the domain.
C. aCCessIBIlIty of data
The Internet provides one the possibility of  unlimited information (data) 
distribution. However, some communications might be undesirable and fuel 
dangerous social phenomena (e.g., glorifying Nazism or insulting religious feelings). 
Therefore, it is claimed that the state has the right to normalise and punish 
behaviour that leads to the creation of  a message available in its territory.104
There are no obstacles preventing reference to the criterion of  the 
availability of  a message as a validation or penalisation argument.105 It should be 
assumed that a message posted on the Internet reaches every country.106 
The inability to reasonably rely on the accessibility argument stems not 
so much from the lack of  predictability as from the inconclusive character. Thus, 
a claim to normalise or punish the same behaviour can be reported by several 
dozen countries. In this situation, it is impossible to determine who has a stronger 
power.107
In practice, reference to the criterion of  the availability of  a message will 
be reduced to demanding such a narrowing of  its scope that it will not be available 
in the territory of  a given country.108 Such a request is, however, made not under 
criminal law but under private or administrative law. Moreover, the recipient of  
the request will not be the perpetrator here but rather the person who has the 
104 Dow Jones and Company Inc v Gutnick [2002] HCA 56; 210 CLR 575; Yahoo! v. LICRA (n 53); ECJ 
Hedjuk C-441/13 (2015). See also: Allen (n 3) 74; Chen (n 52) 434; Treppoz (n 14) 277; Edward 
Lee (n 18) 1288; Lanza (n 52) 132; Kohl (n 18) 47.
105 The criterion for the availability of  the message was used by France in the dispute with Yahoo! 
(Yahoo! v LICRA, n 53). The portal offered Nazi souvenirs in its auction house, the sale of  which 
was prohibited in France. Among the many steps to block the auction, the French prosecutor’s 
office also initiated criminal proceedings against Timothy Koogle, a former executive director. See, 
among others: Chen (n 52) 448; Grootes (n 12) 3–4; Kohl (n 18) 100.
106 Dow Jones v Gutnick (n 104); Chen (n 52) 423; Zekos (n 13) 6; Kulesza (n 2) 15.
107 For these reasons, the accessibility criterion is questioned as an enabling condition of  regulation. 
See ECJ L’Oreal C-324/09 (2011). Studies suggest replacing them with the criterion of  purpose. 
See among others Treppoz (n 14) 282; Goldsmith (n 26) 15; Isaacson (n 51) 922.
108 Yahoo! v LICRA (n 53). See also: Chen (n 52) 447; Treppoz (n 14) 277–8; Daskal, Borders (n 18) 
195; Allen (n 3) 83; Charmaine H Perdon, “The Regulation of  Cyberspace” (1999) 73 Phil LJ 
569, 595–7; Kohl (n 18) 228–9.
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technical means of  modifying such a coverage (e.g., administrator of  the auction 
site on which souvenirs from the period of  Nazi Germany are sold).109
d. language of tHe message
Due to the undecidable nature of  the jurisdictional link in the form of  a 
message, some countries have begun using the criterion of  language.110 Language 
can be a rational criterion that narrows the circle of  information recipients and 
clarifies the scope of  its effect. Moreover, it often coincides with the national 
criterion.
There are no formal obstacles preventing the construction of  a meaningful 
language-based argument—both in the validation discourse and penalisation. The 
question is about their persuasive power. The language of  the message should be 
considered in those cases in which it clearly identifies the information recipient. 
The situation is complicated in the case of  common languages, in particular 
English, which is currently the lingua franca of  cyberspace. Against this background, 
a problem of  languages is also recognised as official in a larger number of  countries 
(e.g., Spanish, English, and German). Each of  them will be able to rely on the same 
circumstance as a validation or penalisation argument, which will create further 
conflicts of  jurisdiction.
VII. proCess of weIgHIng arguments Based on a jurIsdICtIonal lInk
In international law, no universally accepted hierarchy of  jurisdictional 
links has been developed. It appears necessary to present the method of  weighing 
their significance. It will thus be possible to compare the strengths of  the arguments 
that are based on them. The weighing method will be slightly different in the case 
of  both types of  arguments.
In the case of  validation arguments, the weighing process must lead to an 
unambiguous determination of  which directive of  conduct applies to the person 
in a given classification. The effect of  the validation discourse should be the 
answer to the question, “What is the norm applicable in situation X?” The person 
undertaking the activity must be able to determine the unambiguous content of  
the law binding him or her. This requirement does not mean that there will be any 
109 Chen (n 52) 452; Edward Lee (n 18) 1330.
110 Treppoz (n 14) 282; Susan N Exon, “Personal Jurisdiction: Lost in Cyberspace?” (2003) 8 Com-
puter L Rev & Tech J 21, 34.
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certainty here. Rather, the need to unambiguously determine the content of  one 
binding standard will be associated with a high risk of  error.
Which of  the arguments (interests) in favour of  the right to regulate a given 
situation by state X will be considered the most important must be set in concerto. 
This process occurs in two stages.
First, the nature of  the interests must be considered. International law has 
not developed a precise method of  weighing them. There are no categories that 
can be characterised by greater recognition or recognisability. Moreover, the claim 
can be supported by many validation arguments, based on various links, which 
will be followed by their stronger binding power. When assessing the relevance 
of  a country’s interest, it is necessary to use the so-called rule of  reason,111 
which is derived from four principles of  international law: the principle of  non-
intervention,112 the principle of  equity,113 the principle of  proportionality,114 and 
the prohibition of  abuse of  law.115 From this perspective, an attempt to normalise a 
given social situation by the state with a less significant interest (weaker argument) 
can be treated as a violation of  international law (rule of  reason) and be the subject 
of  proceedings before the International Court of  Justice.
Second, one should verify whether the claim of  the state who holds the 
strongest arguments is not blocked by negative premise. Such a negative premise 
is the lack of  objective predictability (foreseeability) of  the occurrence of  a given 
jurisdictional link. If  a given circumstance is unrecognisable ex ante (at the moment 
of  behaviour), then it cannot be the basis for a validation argument. Consequently, 
this argument must be rejected, which can lead to a denial of  the right to regulate 
a given behaviour by a state. An attempt to enforce such a denied right might also 
constitute a violation of  international law or human rights.116
Note also that for some norms, conflict-of-law rules apply. This point will be 
true primarily in the case of  private law.117 In this respect, due to the existence of  
precise collision solutions, reference to the general rule of  reason is not necessary.
The process of  weighing penal arguments will be slightly different. The 
effect of  penal discourse should be the answer to the question, “can the court of  
state X punish the perpetrator of  the act?” There is no need to explicitly determine 
111 August (n 3) 535; Płachta (n 34) 122; Ryngaert (n 5) 143. 
112 Ryngaert (n 5) 144. 
113 Subir K Chattopadhyay, “Equity in International Law: Its Growth and Development” (1975) 5 Ga 
J Int’l & Comp L 381, 392; Władysław Czapliński and Anna Wyrozumska, Prawo międzynarodowe 
publiczne. Zagadnienia systemowe (C.H. Beck 2014) 138–42. 
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which state has the exclusive right to punish. International law does not know the 
universally binding prohibition ne bis in idem.118 Theoretically, it will be possible to 
punish the perpetrator repeatedly for the same act by various authorised states. 
Imposing a punishment on an individual in principle does not interfere in 
the internal relationships of  a foreign country. Against this background, however, 
there can be a violation of  human rights. It is forbidden to punish a behaviour that 
did not constitute a crime based on the law binding the perpetrator at the time of  
commitment of  the act. The law that binds the perpetrator at the time and place 
of  the act is determined based on the validation arguments. If  the punishment 
is inflicted by a foreign state but for an act that constitutes a crime also based on 
the law applicable to the perpetrator, there is no breach of  the principle of  nullum 
crimen.
VIII. summary
The considerations presented above allow drawing the following final 
conclusions. First, shifting the burden of  validation discourse from the plane of  
jurisdiction principles to the level of  weighing the interests of  individual entities 
allows more efficient settlement of  conflicts of  jurisdiction. Individual interests 
are subject to weighing—it is possible to compare their significance. Second, the 
application of  the method based on the weighing of  interests allows avoiding the 
deadlock that occurs when several states invoke the same jurisdictional principle—
for example, in the case of  effective territoriality. Third, by referring to the rule of  
reason derived from the four principles of  international law recognised by civilised 
nations, individual states can question the possibility of  applying foreign law to 
the regulation of  specific social situations. Disputes can be resolved by diplomatic 
channels or before international law courts.
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Janusz Tylman, “Środki przymusu w postępowaniu karnym przeciwko cudzoziemcom” in Andrzej 
Szwarc (ed), Przestępczość przygraniczna. Postępowanie karne przeciwko cudzoziemcom w Polsce (Wydawnic-
two Poznańskie 2000) 43. 
